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Washington's Equal Rights Amendment: It Says
What It Means and It Means What It Says
I. INTRODUCTION
More than twelve years ago the voters of Washington State
approved the addition of article XXXI to the Washington State
Constitution.1 Article XXXI, most commonly known as the
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), provides that legal rights and
responsibilities shall not be denied or abridged on account of
sex.2 In the twelve years since its adoption, few cases have
turned on an interpretation of the ERA. The existence of the
ERA, however, has strengthened Washington laws4 that protect
1. The voters approved article XXXI (the state's equal rights amendment) on Nov.
7, 1972. See infra note 38 for the statistical results of the election.
2. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI reads as follows:
§ 1 Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or
abridged on account of sex.
§ 2 The legislature shall have the power to enforce by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
3. Washington courts have interpreted the ERA to decide the following cases:
Southwest Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d
109, 127, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983) (county affirmative action plan upheld because ERA
allows sex-based classifications intended to eliminate the effects of past discrimination);
MacLean v. First N.W. Indus., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 347-48, 635 P.2d 683, 688 (1981) (appli-
cation of the ERA to a discount ticket pricing policy on "ladies' night" was precluded
because the policy did not discriminate on the basis of sex); Seattle v. Buchanan, 90
Wash. 2d 584, 592, 584 P.2d 918, 922 (1978) (lewd conduct ordinance prohibiting expo-
sure of female breasts upheld because the ordinance applied equally to men and women
by requiring them to cover parts of their bodies associated with the procreative func-
tion); Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wash. 2d 298, 305-06, 582 P.2d 487, 491 (1978) (state
statute requiring equal representation of both sexes on political committees upheld
because it promoted equality and did not discriminate on the basis of sex), aff'd, 442
U.S. 191 (1979); State v. Wood, 89 Wash. 2d 97, 103, 569 P.2d 1148, 1151 (1977) (filiation
provisions of statute do not violate the ERA because they do not deny the father any
rights or create any new responsibilities in him; both parents shared responsibility for
the child's support); Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 877, 540 P.2d 882, 893 (1975) (the
ERA prohibits the state from forbidding girls to play contact football with boys); Singer
v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 264, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (1974) (the marriage statute does
not violate the ERA because it requires marriage between persons of the opposite sex).
4. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 2.36.080 (1983) (forbids exclusion of any citizen
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persons from sex discrimination.
The drive for state equal rights amendments began in the
1960s, as legal and political activists started discussing the need
for changes in the nation's legal structure that would guarantee
equality for all persons.5 The United States Supreme Court was
not viewed as the forum in which sexual equality would be
achieved. Historically, the United States Supreme Court's appli-
cation of the equal protection clause' to sex discrimination
claims has been characterized by a strong belief in women's
"separate place"7 and by casual review of state legislative classi-
from jury selection based on sex); WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.09 (1983) (statute recognizes
equal status of spouses and does not favor one over the other); WASH. REV. CODE ch.
26.16 (1983) (treats both spouses as partners and protects both the property earned as a
community and that owned separately); WASH. REV. CODE ch. 28A.85 (1983) (statute pro-
hibits discrimination on the basis of sex against any student in grades K-12 of the Wash-
ington public schools); WASH. REV. CODE ch. 28B.04 (1983) (establishes guidelines under
which the council for post secondary education shall contract to provide services and
programs of job training for displaced homemakers); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.300 (1983)
(prohibits any insurance company from cancelling or refusing to issue an insurance con-
tract on the basis of sex); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.12.175 (1983) (forbids employers from
discriminating in the payment of wages between males and females who are similarly
employed); WASH. REV. CODE ch. 49.60 (1983) (statute forbids sex discrimination in
employment, credit and insurance transactions, places of public resort and accommoda-
tion or amusement, and real property transactions).
5. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitu-
tional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 874 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Brown]. This article, which is frequently cited in court opinions and other law review
articles, explores the changes that are necessary in the legal structure to achieve a uni-
fied system of equality. Arguing in. favor of a federal constitutional amendment, the
authors discuss various methods by which the legal structure could be changed to guar-
antee sexual equality, trace the development of various ERA proposals in Congress,
explain the constitutional framework of the ERA, and provide examples of how the legal
structure would change, after ratification of the ERA, in labor legislation, domestic rela-
tions, criminal law, and the military.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. In Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872), Justice Bradley stated:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organiza-
tion, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of
things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the
domain and functions of womanhood.
Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
See also Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (upholding a state statute that
excused women from jury service unless they voluntarily applied; court held that the
classification was reasonable because "a woman should be relieved from the civic duty of
jury service unless she herself determines that such service is consistent with her own
special responsibilities [as the center of home and family life]"); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (upholding a state statute that provided that no female could be
licensed as a bartender unless she was the wife or daughter of a male owner because
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fications based on stereotypical views of women.8 Consequently,
the equal protection clause has not always prohibited sex dis-
crimination.9 Unable to fight sex discrimination adequately
under the federal Constitution, advocates of women's rights
sought revision of existing discriminatory statutes. 10 Such efforts
proved frustrating, however, because of the difficulty of mobiliz-
ing the national and state political machinery."
Proponents of equal rights thus turned to a third approach
for creating a system of sexual equality: passage of a constitu-
tional equal rights amendment at the federal or state level or
both. 2 At both levels of government, proponents and opponents
of constitutional amendments have debated the merits of an
ERA."3 The fundamental debate over the issue has focused on
how the courts would and should interpret an equal rights
provision."'
"[t]he [equal protection clause] does not require legislatures to reflect sociological insight
or shifting social standards"); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (special statu-
tory protection for women in employment held not arbitrary or unreasonable under the
fourteenth amendment due process clause because "woman's physical structure and the
performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsis-
tence. . . . [H]ealthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being
of women becomes an object of public interest . . . in order to preserve the strength and
vigor of the race").
8. Brown, supra note 5, at 876. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 69 (1961)
(upholding Florida statute that excluded women from jury service unless they volunta-
rily applied because women were still regarded as the center of home and family life and
should be relieved from their civic duties); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465-66
(1948) (Michigan statute prohibiting licensing of females as bartenders was upheld
because the United States Constitution does not require legislatures to reflect the chang-
ing position of women in our society); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1872) (state
bar association rule excluding women from admission to the bar upheld because women
were not being denied a privilege or immunity of United States citizenship and thus were
subject to exclusive state regulation).
9. Brown, supra note 5, at 876. See infra note 57 for a discussion of the United
States Supreme Court's standard of review for sex discrimination claims under the equal
protection clause.
10. Brown, supra note 5, at 883. Examples of discriminatory state statutes are those
that restrict women's entry into certain occupations and those that give protective labor
benefits to women. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 884.
13. Id. at 886.
14. Id. at 888. Proponents of equal rights amendments argue that courts should
interpret such provisions as prohibiting all sex-based classifications except those that
protect an individual right to privacy, id. at 900, and those based on characteristics
found in all members of one sex and in no member of the other. Id. at 893. The right to
privacy would permit separation of the sexes in public rest rooms, in sleeping quarters of
prisons or similar public institutions, and in living conditions of the armed forces. Id.
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The state courts have dealt with equal rights provisions in a
variety of ways. These general approaches can be categorized as
follows: (1) avoid the constitutional question; (2) find that any
rational relationship between the classification and the legisla-
tive goal satisfies the constitutional guarantee; (3) apply the sus-
pect class/strict scrutiny standard used by the United States
Supreme Court to review racial classifications; and (4) apply an
absolute standard by which all sex-based classifications are
prohibited. 5
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is the only state court
that has adopted an absolute standard of review.1 6 When the
Washington Supreme Court first applied the ERA, it held that
the ERA prohibited all sex discrimination. 7 Since then, how-
ever, the court has eroded this absolute prohibition by allowing
sex-based classifications intended to promote equal treatment of
the sexes.' The court thus has modified an absolute prohibition
of all sex-based classifications into one that merely prohibits
harmful discrimination based on sex. The Washington Supreme
Court should follow the Pennsylvania court's example by adher-
ing to the absolute standard and the electoral mandate. Only
then will article XXXI have its intended force and meaning.
This Comment begins with a discussion of the ERA's legis-
lative history and the legislature's attempt to bring state stat-
utes into compliance with the ERA upon its passage. Next, judi-
cial interpretations of the new constitutional guarantee are
The classic example of a law that would allow a constitutional classification based on the
unique physical characteristics of each sex would be one regulating wet nurses or sperm
donors. Id. at 894.
A basic legal principle underlying the ERA is that a law must deal with particular
attributes of individuals, not with a classification based on the broad attribute of sex.
Legislation that classifies persons based on a physical characteristic unique to a sex does
not deny equal rights to the other sex since the regulated attribute does not apply to
members of both sexes. On the other hand, legislative classifications of this kind can
extend only to physical characteristics and not to psychological, social, or other cultural
characteristics found to some degree in members of both sexes. "Differences in treatment
attributable to such shared traits must be based upon their existence in the individual,
not upon a classification by sex." Id. at 893-94.
15. See generally Note, Equal Rights Provisions: The Experience Under State
Constitutions, 65 CAIF. L. REV. 1086, 1088-89 (1977). This article surveys the states that
have constitutional equal rights provisions and categorizes the way in which each state's
courts have interpreted the state ERA.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 152-64
17. Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 877, 540 P.2d 882, 893 (1975).
18. Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wash. 2d 298, 305, 582 P.2d 487, 491 (1978), afl'd, 442
U.S. 191 (1979).
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compared to the interpretation of the Washington Constitution's
privileges and immunities clause. 9 Finally, the Comment com-
pares Washington's standard of review with a similar standard
used by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and argues that the
Washington Supreme Court should adopt the absolute standard
applied by the Pennsylvania courts.
II. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND OF WASHINGTON'S ERA
Representative Lois North introduced a constitutional
amendment" into the Washington State House of Representa-
tives on January 11, 1972.21 The proposed amendment simply
provided that equality of rights and responsibilities could not be
denied or taken away from anyone because of his or her sex.22
The resolution embodying the amendment also stated that at
the next general election Washington voters would decide
whether equal rights should be constitutionally guaranteed.2
The proponents of the ballot measure24 believed that the ERA
would require equal treatment of the sexes under the law; the
state could no longer pass laws conferring benefits or placing
obligations on one sex and not on the other.25 Supporters of the
ERA assured Washington voters that discriminatory education
requirements would become illegal, that the ERA would not
require unisex restrooms, and that the ERA would not disrupt
19. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12. This provision of the Washington Constitution reads:
"Special Privileges and Immunities Prohibited. No law shall be passed granting to any
citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities
which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations." See
infra notes 58-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the supreme court's analysis
under the privileges and immunities clause, which is analogous to federal equal protec-
tion analysis of sex-based classifications.
20. H.J. Res. 61, 42d Leg., 2d Ex. Sess., 1972 Wash. Laws 526.
21. HOUSE JOURNAL, STATE OF WASHINGTON, 2D Ex. SESS. 1972, at 50. The engrossed
bill was amended to include the words "and responsibility." Id. at 295. On Jan. 24, 1972,
the house voted 96-3 to adopt H.J.R. 61; on Feb. 10, the senate passed the bill. Id. at
295, 793. See infra text accompanying notes 112-20 for a discussion of the meaning of the
words "and responsibility."
22. H.J. Res. 61, 42d Leg., 2d Ex. Sess., 1972 Wash. Laws 526.
23. Id.
24. Proponents included Peter D. Francis, Democratic state senator, Seattle; Lois
North, Republican state representative, Seattle; A.J. Pardini, Republican state represen-
tative, Spokane; Betty Fletcher, President, Seattle King County Bar Association, Seattle.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER'S PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION
TUESDAY, Nov. 7, 1972, at 52 [hereinafter cited as OFFICIAL VOTER'S PAMPHLET].
25. Id.
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family life.2"
Opponents of the ERA27 agreed that women should have
equal employment opportunity, should be paid equally for equal
work, and should receive equal credit consideration.2" They
argued, however, that the ERA would result in unintended soci-
etal consequences such as elimination of preferential insurance
rates, integrated high school athletic teams, homosexual mar-
riages, elimination of divorce, welfare, and child custody prefer-
ences for women, and mandatory combat duty for military
women.
29
The differences in viewpoints expressed by the proponents
and opponents of the Washington ERA reflect the widespread
and fundamental debate over how equal rights provisions should
be interpreted.30 Advocates in the Washington Legislature
wanted the courts to interpret the ERA subjectively.3 ' Under
such interpretation, the ERA would permit differentiation
between the sexes based upon unique physical characteristics 2
and would also permit laws protecting an individual's constitu-
tional right to privacy.3 3 The ERA's opponents, on the other
hand, believed that the courts could only interpret the ERA
objectively.34 Under this theory of constitutional interpretation,
the courts would construe all sex-based classifications as
26. Id.
27. Senator Jack Metcalf, Republican state senator, Mukilteo; James P. Kuehnle,
Republican state representative, Spokane; Mrs. Robert G. Young, State Chairman,
H.O.W. League of Housewives, Inc., Bellevue. Id. at 53.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See supra text accompanying notes 5-14. For an excellent and detailed account
of this debate, see Brown, supra note 5, at 875-85.
31. JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, THE
POTENTIAL IMPACT OF HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 61-THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT-ON
THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 2, 28 (1972) [hereinafter cited as THE POTENTIAL
IMPACT]. The Washington State Legislative Council was created by the legislature and
consisted of fifteen state senators and sixteen state representatives. WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 44.24.010 (1983). One of the council's purposes was to make reports to the legisla-
ture and the public with respect to any of its studies of governmental issues and proce-
dures. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 44.24.020(5) (1983). The statute authorizing the legisla-
tive council was repealed in 1983. 1983 Wash. Laws ch. 52, § 7.
32. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 31, at 2. See supra note 14 and accompany-
ing text.
33. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 31, at 2. An example of a law protecting a
person's right to privacy while embodying a sex-based classification is one requiring sep-
arate restrooms for each sex.
34. Id. at 3-4.
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unconstitutional.3 5
An absolute standard of judicial review embraces both of
these theories of interpretation. Even though the absolute stan-
dard prohibits all sex-based classifications, the standard must be
applied in a manner consistent with other constitutional rights,
including an individual's right to privacy:3 Additionally, classifi-
cations based on the unique physical characteristics of one sex
are not discriminatory as long as the characteristics are found in
all members of one sex and in no members of the other sex. 7
The Washington electorate narrowly adopted the new con-
stitutional amendment.38 Acting upon this rather weak mandate,
the state legislature amended existing laws so that all statutory
language was sex neutral 3 9 However, the rules of construction 0
already explicitly stated that "words importing the masculine
gender may be extended to females also." '41 Passage of the act,
therefore, was unnecessary."' The legislature wanted to show
Washington citizens that it was serious about protecting equal
rights for women, but its attempt was of little real
consequence.4"
The implementation of the amending act was equally inef-
fective. The act" amended statutes dealing with domestic rela-
tions, criminal definitions (such as rape and prostitution), mar-
riage, employment, and pension benefits. Unfortunately, the
revisions merely changed words; they did not address the under-
lying policies or assumptions of the laws.4 5 In some instances the
sex-neutral language did not necessarily result in equal rights for
35. Id. at 4.
36. Brown, supra note 5, at 900.
37. Id. at 893. See also supra note 14.
38. On Nov. 7, 1972, the Washington electorate voted 645,115 (50.13%) for the
ERA; 641,746 (49.87%) voted against the measure, a difference of only 3,369 votes out of
1,286,861 votes cast. A. KRAMER, ABSTRACT OF VOTES, PRESIDENTIAL AND STATE GENERAL
ELECTION HELD ON NOVEMBER 7, 1972, at 3 (1972). The outcome was uncertain until all
the absentee ballots were counted. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Nov. 9, 1972, at A5, col. 1.
39. Act of Apr. 24, 1973, ch. 154, 1973 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1118. The act
amends 129 state statutes to bring them into conformity with the ERA.
40. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 1.12 (1983).
41. Id. § 1.12.050.
42. Dybwad, Implementing Washington's ERA: The Problem with Wholesale Leg-
islative Revision, 49 WASH. L. REV. 571, 572 (1974) ("Consequently, except for the psy-
chological value of the statutes drafted to be sex neutral, these amendments will have
little impact.").
43. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
44. Act of Apr. 24, 1973, ch. 154, 1973 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1118.
45. Dybwad, supra note 42, at 578-79.
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women because implicit sex-role assumptions were retained from
the original legislation." In domestic relations, in particular, the
language changes had little impact on statutory purpose and
effect. 47 The man continued to be regarded as the family's pri-
mary breadwinner and the person responsible for his wife's and
children's financial support.48 The woman continued to be con-
sidered the family's primary caretaker and homemaker, regard-
less of the family's actual needs and support. 9
The legislature attempted in good faith to right these
wrongs, but the attempt fell far short of addressing the problem
that the ERA was adopted to solve. Since this first attempt,
however, the legislature has revised existing laws and has passed
new laws that strongly protect sexual equality.50 The ERA
expressly states that laws cannot discriminate on the basis of
sex. A statute containing sex-neutral language, however, does
not end discrimination. The ERA requires that all discrimina-
tory purposes and effects be abolished.
III. THE EFFECT OF THE ERA ON STATE EQUAL PROTECTION
ANALYSIS
The legislature's immediate attempt to conform state stat-
utes to the ERA did little to achieve true sexual equality. Soon
after passage of the ERA, however, the Washington Supreme
Court applied a strict standard to sex-based classifications 51 by
using the state's privileges and immunities clause.2 By applying
such a standard, the court took a large step toward promoting
the sexual equality that the ERA was designed to achieve.
Prior to the passage of the ERA, victims of sex discrimina-
46. For example, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.20.030 (1983) provides criminal sanctions
for parental nonsupport of children. The legislature changed the statutory language so
that it was sex neutral, Act of Apr. 24, 1973, ch. 154, § 34(1)(c), 1973 Wash. Laws 1st Ex.
Sess. 1118, 1137, but the assumption that the father is the primary breadwinner remains
implicit in the statutory language. Dybwad, supra note 42, at 580.
47. See Dybwad, supra note 42, at 577-83.
48. Id. at 580. The spousal support statute originally placed an affirmative duty on
husbands to provide their wives with necessary food, clothing, and shelter. Id. at 581.
The assumption that a wife is economically helpless is no longer valid. Id. at 582. The
amendatory act extended support responsibility to wives as well as to husbands but
ignored the underlying assumption justifying the duty to support either spouse. Id.
49. Id. at 581-82.
50. See supra note 4.
51. Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 201, 517 P.2d 599, 603 (1973).
52. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12.
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tion in Washington relied primarily on federal" and state54 con-
stitutional equal protection clauses to challenge governmental
actions that classify persons on the basis of their sex.5 5 The
United States Supreme Court generally reviews sex-based classi-
fications with an intermediate level of scrutiny.56 The Court
examines sex-based classifications to see whether they serve
important governmental objectives and whether the discrimina-
tory means employed are substantially related to the achieve-
ment of those objectives. If the objectives are important and the
means are reasonably related to those objectives, the classifica-
tion stands.5 7
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
54. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12.
55. Sex discrimination victims also relied strongly on federal anti-discrimination
statutes. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in employment.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1984).
56. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982) (state
statute excluding males from admission to state-supported nursing school violated the
fourteenth amendment because the school's policy perpetuated the stereotyped view of
nursing as a woman's job and the school failed to show that the sex-based classification
was substantially and directly related to the school's objective to compensate for past
discrimination against women); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 472-73
(1981) (California statutory rape law did not unlawfully discriminate on basis of gender
because the sex-based classification realistically reflected that the sexes are not similarly
situated in certain circumstances, and because the classification bore a fair and substan-
tial relationship to the government's efforts to control the problem of teenage
pregnancies); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 459 (1981) (Louisiana statute granting
husband, as head and master of property jointly owned with wife, the unilateral right to
dispose of the property without wife's consent violates the fourteenth amendment
because the state failed to justify the classification as a furtherance of an important gov-
ernmental interest).
57. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (Court struck down Oklahoma statute
defining the beginning of majority as age 18 for women and as age 21 for men because
the sex-based classification and the state's interest in traffic safety were not substantially
related). The Supreme Court refuses to consider sex a suspect class. Suspect classifica-
tions are reviewed with strict judicial scrutiny; states must have a compelling interest for
the classification. The Court originally accorded special treatment to racial classifications
because of the central purpose of the fourteenth amendment. Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1124-25 (1969). Other traits, such as
alienage and national origin, have received similar treatment. See Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948)
(national origin). Judicial intervention to review suspect classifications has been justified
as a way to protect minority groups. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra
this note, at 1125. But when some groups in the community are politically important,
legislative decisions expressing the will of the majority are not proper. "[W]hen politi-
cally disadvantaged minorities are affected, the legislative judgment should be more crit-
ically regarded, for such disadvantaged groups wield less influence in legislative councils
than their proportion in the population would seem to warrant." Id. Arguably, sex-based
classifications also fit the suspect classification criteria and should be subjected to strict
scrutiny. Until early in the 20th century, women were not allowed to vote and were dis-
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In Hanson v. Hutt, decided in 1973, the Washington
Supreme Court declined to apply this intermediary standard to
the state equal protection clause, choosing instead to identify
sex as an inherently suspect classification. 58 Such identification
meant that any sex-based classification was subject to strict
scrutiny by the courts and would be upheld only if it satisfied a
compelling governmental interest that could not be achieved by
less discriminatory classifications.5 9 In Hanson, the Washington
Supreme Court applied the strict scrutiny standard because
Washington voters had recently adopted the ERA, an expression
of the will of the people that all sex-based classifications should
be prohibited. 0 The Hanson court held that a statute denying
unemployment benefits to pregnant women6 ' was unconstitu-
tional.6 2 Hanson was decided on equal protection grounds
because the plaintiff did not raise the ERA issue.6 3 The court
concluded that the statute discriminated on the basis of sex
because only women can become pregnant.6 4 The classification
thus placed a heavier economic burden on women seeking unem-
ployment compensation. 5
After finding that the statute was discriminatory, the court
declared the sex-based classification inherently suspect, reason-
ing that "[s]ex .. .is an immutable trait, a status into which
the class members are locked by the accident of birth . . . [and]
the characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to per-
form or contribute to society. ' 6 6 Because the court considered
sex a suspect classification, it subjected the challenged statute to
couraged from participating in many aspects of political, business, and social life. Sex,
just like race, is an immutable characteristic with which persons are born. Like race, sex
has no correlation to an individual's abilities. Thus, because statutory classifications
based on sex bear no relationship to the state's purpose, they would be struck down
under a strict scrutiny analysis.
58. Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 201, 517 P.2d 599, 603 (1973) ("[W]e hold
that the classification based on sex contained in [the statute] is inherently suspect and
therefore must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.").
59. Id. at 201-02, 517 P.2d at 603.
60. Id. at 200-01, 517 P.2d at 603.
61. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.20.030 (1962), repealed by Act of June 27, 1975, ch.
228, § 18, 1975 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 753.
62. Hanson, 83 Wash. 2d at 202, 517 P.2d at 603.
63. Id. at 198, 517 P.2d at 601. The case was pleaded in Aug. 1971, before adoption
of the ERA in Nov. 1972.
64. Id. at 198, 517 P.2d at 601-02.
65. Id. at 198, 517 P.2d at 602.
66. Id. at 199, 517 P.2d at 602 (quoting Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 18, 485
P.2d 529, 540, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 340 (1971)).
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a standard of strict judicial scrutiny. 7 Upon application of this
standard, the court found no compelling state interest in the
sex-based classification."8 The reluctance of potential employers
to hire pregnant women did not provide a rational basis for
denying unemployment benefits to those women. 9
Ironically, the adoption of the Washington ERA may have
led to the demise of the Hanson standard. The supreme court
refused to apply the strict scrutiny test to sex-based classifica-
tions recently in Southwest Washington Chapter, National
Electrical Contractors Association v. Pierce County, a challenge
to a county affirmative action plan.70 The court concluded that
while it could interpret the state privileges and immunities pro-
vision to place more stringent limitations on affirmative action
than the United States Supreme Court would impose under the
equal protection clause, it found no compelling reason to do so.71
Instead, the court ruled that Washington's ERA provided the
standard that should be applied.72 Moreover, the court expressly
retreated from its earlier interpretation of article I, section 12
that imposed a strict scrutiny standard on sex-based classifica-
tions.73 According to the court, "[tihe ERA alone now governs
our review of sex-based classifications."'
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE ERA
In Hanson, the Washington Supreme Court expanded its
67. Hanson, 83 Wash. 2d at 201, 517 P.2d at 603.
68. Id. at 202, 517 P.2d at 603. The state asserted that pregnant women are not
genuinely attached to the labor market, thus justifying the classification of women as
persons ineligible for unemployment benefits. However, the supreme court found "ample
evidence to support the trial court's finding that pregnant women are attached to the
labor market and that there is no medical basis in fact for their disqualification." Id. at
201, 517 P.2d at 603.
69. Id. ("[Tihe attitude of potential employers is not an appropriate rationale to use
as a basis for disqualifying a class of claimant for unemployment insurance.").
70. 100 Wash. 2d 109, 667 P.2d 1092 (1983).
71. Id. at 127, 667 P.2d at 1102.
72. Id. ("The ERA ... is a very different animal from the equal protection
clause-indeed, it has no counterpart in the federal constitution. The ERA absolutely
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex and is not subject to even the narrow excep-
tions permitted under the traditional 'strict scrutiny.' ").
73. Id. at 128 n.3, 667 P.2d at 1102 n.3. ("Of course, an affirmative action program
for members of one sex must still satisfy the requirements of the federal constitution.
We hold only that no additional limitations are imposed by the [privileges and immuni-
ties clause of the] state constitution.").
74. Id.
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analysis of the federal equal protection 75 and state privileges and
immunities clauses76 by requiring strict judicial scrutiny of sus-
pect sex classifications. 77 The court, however, severely restricted
this interpretation in Southwest Washington Chapter.78 Earlier,
the supreme court had confronted the inconsistency between the
ERA and the privileges and Immunities clause in Darrin v.
Gould.79 The Darrin court stated that article XXXI of the
Washington Constitution added substance to the prior prevail-
ing law by eliminating sex discrimination that could pass the
rational relationship or strict scrutiny tests.80 The court said
that the people of Washington State must have intended to do
more than adopt already existing constitutional law governing
sex discrimination because they voted for the broad, sweeping
language of the ERA."
In Darrin, the court held that a statewide interscholastic
athletic association regulation prohibiting girls from playing
high school contact football with boys violated the ERA. 2 The
court found that the regulations discriminated against girls
because of their sex, not because of their ability to play foot-
ball. 83 The girls who challenged the regulation had met all of the
eligibility requirements, including participation in sufficient
practice sessions, but the athletic association denied them the
opportunity to play in games. The association justified the regu-
lation by arguing that the risk of injury was too great and that
allowing girls to play on boys' teams would disrupt girls' athletic
programs.8 4 These arguments, in the court's opinion, were insuf-
ficient to provide an acceptable basis for the sex-based classifica-
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
76. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12.
77. See supra notes 68 & 72 and accompanying text.
78. 100 Wash. 2d 109, 667 P.2d 1092 (1983).
79. 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
80. Id. at 871, 540 P.2d at 889.
81. Id. Four justices grudgingly concurred in the result:
With some qualms I concur in the result reached by the majority . ...
Whether the people in enacting the ERA fully contemplated and appreciated
the result here reached . . . may be questionable. Nevertheless, in sweeping
language they embedded the principle of the ERA in our constitution, and it is
beyond the authority of this court to modify the people's will. So be it.
Id. at 878, 540 P.2d at 893 (Hamilton, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 877, 540 P.2d at 893. ("[T]he WIAA rule discriminating against girls on
account of their sex violates Const. art. 31.
83. Id. at 875, 540 P.2d at 891.
84. Id. at 875-76, 540 P.2d at 892.
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tion.8 5 The court found the overriding compelling state interest
to be that "[e]quality of rights and responsibilities under the law
shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex."8' 6 Sex dis-
crimination under the Washington ERA is forbidden. 7
The court inserted some flexibility into this absolute rule,
however, in Seattle v. Buchanan,88 when it examined a Seattle
"lewd conduct" ordinance89 prohibiting the exposure of female
breasts in public. The court upheld the ordinance against an
ERA challenge.90 The court reasoned that female and male
breasts are different; all females and all males differ in this char-
acteristic.9' The challenged ordinance applied alike to women
and men by requiring every person to cover those parts of the
body that are intimately associated with the procreative func-
tion.92 The court agreed with the local legislative body that
female breasts are associated with sexual arousal.9 3 Additionally,
the city had a rational purpose for the ordinance-protecting
the public morals.94 A dissenting opinion, agreeing with this por-
85. Id. at 877, 540 P.2d at 892-93. "There is no finding that what may be true for
the majority of girls is true in the case of the Darrin girls . . . or girls like them." Id. at
875, 540 P.2d at 892.
86. Id. at 877, 540 P.2d at 893.
87. Id.
88. 90 Wash. 2d 584, 584 P.2d 918 (1978).
89. The challenged ordinance reads in pertinent part:
A. As used in this section a "lewd act" is:
1. An exposure of one's genitals or female breasts;
2. The touching, caressing or fondling of the genitals or female breasts;
or
3. Sexual intercourse as defined in Section 12A.06.070 A7;
4. Masturbation; or
5. Urination or defecation in a place other than a washroom or toilet
room.
B. A person is guilty of lewd conduct if he intentionally performs any lewd
act in a public place or at a place and under circumstances where such act
could be observed by any member of the public.
SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 12A.10.070 (1980).
90. The plaintiffs contended that the ordinance created an unconstitutional sex-
based classification because there is an insufficient difference in appearance between the
breasts of men and women to justify a law forbidding the exposure of women's and not
men's breasts. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d at 588, 584 P.2d at 919. Cf. Bolser v. Liquor
Control Board, 90 Wash. 2d 223, 231, 580 P.2d 629, 633 (1978) (upholding a Liquor Con-
trol Board regulation prohibiting entertainers in licensed premises from exposing their
breasts or buttocks because the regulation applied to male and female entertainers
equally).
91. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d at 591, 584 P.2d at 921.
92. Id. at 592, 584 P.2d at 922.
93. Id. at 589, 584 P.2d at 920.
94. Id. at 590, 584 P.2d at 920.
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tion of the majority opinion, explained that when a matter that
is regulated or prohibited applies to a physical characteristic
peculiar to one sex and not common to both, the classification
may be valid. 5 Thus, the ERA does not apply to classifications
based on unique physical characteristics of either sex.96 The pur-
pose of the ERA is to prohibit classifications by sex absolutely
when characteristics are shared by members of both sexes.9 7
The Washington Supreme Court allowed an exception to
that absolute prohibition when it again examined the ERA in
Marchioro v. Chaney.9 8 The plaintiffs99 challenged a state stat-
ute requiring the state Democratic committee to consist of one
committeeman and one committeewoman from each county.1"'
The statute also directed the state and county committees to
choose a chair and vice chair of opposite sexes.101 The plaintiffs
argued that the ERA, after Darrin, forbade any classification
based on sex. 10 2 The state supreme court, however, disagreed.
The court replaced the Darrin standard with a different abso-
lute standard: not any classification, but discrimination based
on sex is prohibited. 0 3 The court said that the legislature had
adopted the statute to ensure actual as well as theoretical equal-
ity of rights for women.10 4 Under such a statute, neither sex may
predominate. 0 5 The equal rights amendment, the court rea-
soned, does not guarantee one sex superiority over the other sex.
95. Id. at 616, 584 P.2d at 934 (Horowitz, J., dissenting).
96. Brown, supra note 5, at 893.
97. See supra note 14 and accompanying text for a discussion of exceptions based
on the unique physical characteristics of either sex.
98. 90 Wash. 2d 298, 582 P.2d 487 (1978), aff'd, 442 U.S. 191 (1979).
99. The plaintiffs were Democratic Party state central committee members and
state Democratic Party members. Ironically, the challengers included Karen Marchioro,
the chairwoman of the King County Democratic Committee.
100. WASH. REV. CODE § 29.42.020 (1983).
101. Id. §§ 29.42.020-.030.
102. Marchioro, 90 Wash. 2d at 304, 582 P.2d at 491.
103. Id. at 305, 582 P.2d at 491.
Under the equal rights amendment, the equal protection/suspect classification
test is replaced by the single criterion: Is the classification by sex discrimina-
tory? or, in the language of the amendment, Has equality been denied or
abridged on account of sex? In the language of Darrin[,]. "under the ERA
discrimination on account of sex is forbidden."
Id. (quoting Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 877, 540 P.2d 882, 893 (1975)) (emphasis
in original).
104. Marchioro, 90 Wash. 2d at 306, 582 P.2d at 491. "The legislature has found
that in the conduct of the offices of state committees there shall be an absolute equality
of rights between the sexes." Id. at 306, 582 P.2d at 492.
105. Id.
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It guarantees only equality of treatment.106 Moreover, and most
important, the court stated that if this statute violated the ERA,
the very purpose of the ERA-to achieve equality of rights and
responsibilities between the sexes-would be defeated. '
The court distinguished a statute promoting equality (such
as the one challenged in Marchioro) from one granting special
benefits to women and not to men.'10 Those statutes exclude one
sex in favor of another and, therefore, are not comparable to the
statute challenged in Marchioro.'0 9 The Marchioro statute sim-
ply required that the committee be composed of an equal num-
ber of men and women. This, the court reasoned, would neither
abridge nor deny rights on account of sex. '" 0 The statute itself
mandated equality, which is what the ERA requires."'
In addition to its recognition of a different type of absolute
standard, a significant aspect of the Marchioro opinion was its
analysis of two words included in Washington's ERA that
appear in no other state ERA. Washington's ERA declares that
not only equality of rights but equality of responsibility shall
not be denied or abridged on account of sex.' The Marchioro
decision is the only Washington case in which the supreme court
has interpreted the meaning of the words "and responsibility" in
the ERA. The legislature approved the addition of the words by
the house committee without question,'1 s and Washington citi-
106. Id. at 305, 582 P.2d at 492.
107. Id. at 306, 582 P.2d at 493. "The ironic result of plaintiffs' theory would be to
abolish a statute which mandates equality by invoking a provision of the constitution
passed to guarantee equality." Id. at 306, 582 P.2d at 492.
108. An example of a statute conferring special benefits on women is protective
labor legislation. Until 1973 the Washington labor statute established special conditions
and wages for women and children that were not required for men. WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 49.12.010-.230 (1962), repealed by Act of June 26, 1975, ch. 228, § 18, 1975 Wash.
Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 753. The statute provided in part:
49.12.010. Declaration. The welfare of the state of Washington demands that
women and minors be protected from conditions of labor which have a perni-
cious effect on their health and morals. The state of Washington, therefore,
exercising herein its police and sovereign power declares that inadequate wages
and unsanitary conditions of labor exert such pernicious effect.
This section was amended in 1973 to read "all employees." Act of Sept. 24, 1973, ch. 16,
§ 2, 1973 Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess. 14. Employers were required, for example, to provide
their female employees with seats, so that the women could rest during the day. The
"protective" provisions of the statute were repealed as well. Id. § 19.
109. Marchioro, 90 Wash. 2d at 307, 582 P.2d at 492.
110. Id. at 306, 582 P.2d at 492.
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zens approved the ERA language as presented to them. The
Marchioro court interpreted the responsibility clause to mean
that each sex is required to share in conducting political affairs
through the statutory state committees.14  Thus, a statute
requiring men and women to share equally the benefits and obli-
gations of public activity is permissible under article XXXI.
"When the state, by statute, mandates an equality of responsi-
bility, it is hardly appropriate for this court to hold this statu-
tory mandate to be stricken from the very constitutional provi-
sions which approve it.""' 5
Justice Horowitz strongly dissented from the majority opin-
ion in Marchioro."n He argued that equality of numbers (as
required by the statute) is not the same as equality of rights and
responsibilities." 17 Achieving equality of numbers means that
once a woman is elected to one party office, all other women lose
the right to seek the other office. 1 8 Furthermore, the statute
does not guarantee that the best-qualified candidate will get the
second office if the other position is held by a person of the same
sex." 9 The dissent argued that the statute's classification was
obviously sex-based and had no relationship to each person's
abilities to perform his or her duties.120
The Marchioro court, therefore, qualified the stringent ERA
standard enunciated in Darrin that prohibited all sex-based
classifications. The Marchioro decision prohibited only discrimi-
nation resulting from sex-based classifications.' 2' A few years
114. Id. at 308, 582 P.2d at 493.
115. Id.
116. The supreme court split 5-4 in Marchioro. Justices Dolliver, Rosellini,
Brachtenbach, Williams, and Hicks formed the majority. Justices Stafford, Wright, and
Utter concurred with Justice Horowitz' dissent.
117. Marchioro, 90 Wash. 2d at 316, 582 P.2d at 497 (Horowitz, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 317, 582 P.2d at 497.
119. Id. ("All women desiring to seek and hold the remaining office are denied the
right to do so merely because of their sex.") (emphasis in original).
120. Id.
121. The supreme court again applied this qualification in a recent case in which
building contractors challenged a Pierce County affirmative action plan. Southwest
Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 127,
667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983). Pierce County had developed an affirmative action plan
intended to correct the underrepresentation of women and minorities in the county work
force. The court held that the plan did not violate the state ERA because the ERA
"mandates equality in the strongest of terms and absolutely prohibits the sacrifice of
equality for any state interest . . . . This absolute mandate does not, however, bar
affirmative governmental efforts to create equality in fact." Id. at 127, 667 P.2d at 1102
(emphasis in original).
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later, the supreme court again expressed its unwillingness to
apply the ERA in a case of alleged sex discrimination. In
MacLean v. First Northwest Industries,'22 a male sports fan
challenged the defendant's practice of selling discount profes-
sional basketball tickets to women on "ladies' night." 2 ' The fan
argued that the discount prices violated the state's Law Against
Discrimination. 24 The supreme court disagreed, reasoning that:
(1) the plaintiff suffered no actual damage; (2) the plaintiff ben-
efited from the special 'prices because the ticket purchase was
community property shared with his wife; (3) the defendant did
not discriminate solely on account of sex because it gave dis-
count prices to other groups, including the military, in which
males predominate; (4) the plaintiff was not made to feel unwel-
come; and (5) "most fans" favored the pricing policy."2 5 The
court refused to determine the constitutionality of the pricing
policy under the ERA because "[t]o decide important constitu-
tional questions upon a complaint as sterile as this would be apt
to erode public respect for the Equal Rights Amendment and
deter rather than promote the serious goals for which it was
adopted.' ' 2
6
Justices Utter'2 7 and Dolliver 28 dissented strongly from the
majority analysis in MacLean. Justice Utter argued that the
right to full enjoyment section in the Law Against Discrimina-
tion '12 9 does not require a person to show actual damages because
any discrimination harms the state generally. 30 Justice Dolliver
criticized the majority for minimizing the plaintiff's claim while
ignoring the discriminatory nature of the defendant's practice.'
He believed that the defendant discriminated against males and
A sex-based affirmative action plan must be intended solely to eliminate the effects
of past discrimination and must rest on a rationally-based conclusion that such effects
remain. Id. at 128, 667 P.2d at 1102. In Southwest Wash. Chapter, the court found that
the only conceivable basis for the plan was to ameliorate the effects of past discrimina-
tion. Thus, the court unanimously upheld the Pierce County affirmative action plan. Id.
122. 96 Wash. 2d 338, 635 P.2d 683 (1981).
123. Id. at 340-41, 635 P.2d at 683-84.
124. Id. at 341, 635 P.2d at 684. The Law Against Discrimination is codified at
WASH. REV. CODE ch. 49.60 (1983).
125. MacLean, 96 Wash. 2d at 345, 635 P.2d at 686.
126. Id. at 348, 635 P.2d at 688.
127. Id. (Utter, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 353, 635 P.2d at 691 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
129. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.030(1)(b), .040 (1983).
130. MacLean, 96 Wash. 2d at 351, 635 P.2d at 689-90 (Utter, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 353-54, 635 P.2d at 691 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
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that sufficient state action existed to apply the ERA.1"2 The
majority's argument that plaintiff's claim was "sterile" and not
what the voters had in mind when they adopted the ERA was
pure speculation; ticket-price differentials based on sex could
easily have been one of many activities that the voters hoped
would end.133
The precedential value of MacLean is minimal because of
its questionable application of the Law Against Discrimina-
tion. 1 34 The MacLean case is a striking example of how lightly
the Washington Supreme Court can treat sex discrimination
claims. The court avoided the ERA question and trivialized the
claim as one in which the plaintiff did not suffer from the ticket-
pricing policy. By describing the plaintiff's claim as "sterile" and
132. Id. at 356, 635 P.2d at 692 (Dolliver, J., dissenting). Justice Dolliver analogized
the state action found by the United States Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), to the circumstances in MacLean.In Burton, the City of Wilmington leased some building space to a restaurateur who
discriminated against blacks. The city was responsible for the building maintenance,
payable out of public funds. The Supreme Court found sufficient state action because
"profits earned by discrimination [in pricing policies] not only contribute to, but also are
indispensable elements in, the financial success of a governmental agency." Burton, 365
U.S. at 724. Thus, the city's lease was held to be in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id. at 726. Similarly, the City of Seattle leased one of its public facilities to the
defendant while reserving the right to sell merchandise and also requiring the defendant
to hire city ticket-takers. Seattle thus clearly benefited from this lease as did the city in
Burton. MacLean, 96 Wash. 2d at 355-58, 635 P.2d at 692-93 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
133. MacLean, 96 Wash. 2d at 355-56, 635 P.2d at 693 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
It may be that application of the Equal Rights Amendment to the "promo-
tional" activity of defendant is not the sort of thing the voters had in mind
when they adopted HJR 61. Then again, an equally persuasive argument could
be made that ticket price differentials based on sex were indeed one of a num-
ber of activities which they hoped to end. It is idle to speculate. No evidence of
any kind exists.
Id. at 358, 635 P.2d at 693.
134. The court should not have applied the Law Against Discrimination in this case
because neither the public accommodations section nor its definition of "full enjoyment"
contains any mention of sexual discrimination. Note, Washington's Equal Rights
Amendment and Law Against Discrimination-The Approval of the Seattle Sonics'
"Ladies' Night", 58 WASH. L. REV. 464, 474 (1981).
The public accommodations section prohibits discriminatory pricing in places of
public accommodations. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.215 (1983). "Full enjoyment" is
defined as the right to purchase any service or item in a public accommodation. Id. §
49.60.040. The MacLean court was wrong to read "sex" into that section of the Law
Against Discrimination. Note, supra this note, at 474. Washington courts follow the rule
of statutory construction requiring that they not read into a statute matters that are not
there, nor modify a statute by construction. Id. at 474-76. Perhaps the legislature did not
wish to declare promotional pricing schemes, such as the one in MacLean, as violations
of the Law Against Discrimination. Id. at 475. "The court should not have imposed its
judgment in place of the legislature's." Id.
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"apt to erode public respect for the [ERA]," the court itself
eroded public respect for our judicial and political systems. In
earlier ERA cases, the state supreme court had already recog-
nized a public mandate to outlaw discriminatory sex-based clas-
sifications.1 35 The MacLean decision ignored this mandate and
suggested that some sex-based classifications are acceptable.
The MacLean court also seemed to suggest that sex dis-
crimination claims made by men are less important than those
raised by women. The court's indifference toward men's claims
itself violates the letter and spirit of the ERA. If the court con-
tinues to dismiss such claims lightly, it will be discriminatorily
applying the law. The ERA should protect men as well as
women from sex discrimination.
The state supreme court may have a chance to clarify its
ERA standard by applying it to university women's athletics. A
recent superior court decision, Blair v. Washington State Uni-
versity,1 36 held that Washington State University (WSU) dis-
criminated against women athletes and their coaches in violation
of the ERA, the Law Against Discrimination,1 3 7 and the equal
pay statute. 38 Several WSU women athletes and coaches sued
the university because of discriminatory athletic programs and
compensation. The plaintiffs contended that the university
denied them an equal education and equal employment oppor-
tunities as compared to male athletes and coaches participating
in the same sports.1 39 Judge Philip H. Faris of Whitman County
ordered WSU to treat women's athletic programs and men's pro-
grams equitably. 40 He also enjoined WSU from future discrimi-
nation,"' ordered damages to the women athletes as compensa-
tion for WSU's failure to provide clothing and awards, 42
increased scholarship allocations, 143 and awarded the women
coaches use of complimentary cars. 144 However, the judge did
not find discrimination in the other terms and conditions of the
135. See supra text accompanying notes 79-115 for further discussion of the devel-
opment of the state supreme court's standard of review under the ERA.
136. No. 28816 (Whitman County Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 1983) (memorandum opinion).
137. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 49.60 (1983).
138. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.12.175 (1983).
139. Blair, No. 28816, slip op. at 1 (memorandum opinion).
140. Id. at 7 (judgment and decree).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2-3.
143. Id. at 9-10.
144. Id. at 5-6.
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coaches' employment because WSU had hired the women with
different expectations than it had for the coaches of the four
high-priority men's sports (football, basketball, baseball, and
track) .145
The Blair plaintiffs have appealed the superior court deci-
sion directly to the Washington Supreme Court.14 They contend
that the university should be forced to include the football pro-
gram budget in the total amount allocated to men's and
women's sports. 47 The decision of the trial court distinguished
between men and women athletes by allowing the university to
budget more for men's than for women's sports. The court rec-
ognized that when women entered intercollegiate athletics,
men's sports had already developed into sophisticated, business-
like programs. Men's sports have become commercialized and
therefore require more funding. 48 By applying the absolute
ERA standard and forbidding all sex-based classifications, the
supreme court should reject the trial court's allocation scheme
and include the football program in the total budget that must
be apportioned between men's and women's athletic programs.
The Washington Supreme Court should abolish the Blair
distinction between men's and women's athletic budgets. The
distinction discriminates against women by decreasing their
opportunities to compete among themselves and with athletes at
other schools. The obvious message to women athletes is that
the university is willing to support them to a certain extent, but
not as much as it supports male athletes, especially football
players. The university's budgeting practice meets neither the
absolute standard forbidding all sex-based classifications nor the
Marchioro standard forbidding discriminatory sex-based classifi-
cations. The WSU classification violates the ERA.
The foregoing description of cases interpreting the ERA
145. The judge stated in the order of injunction that 37.5% of the university's
financial support for its entire sports program had to be allocated to women's athletic
programs. Id. at 7. (The football program is exempt from calculation of the university's
athletics budget.) The order directed the university to increase this amount by 2% each
year until the total equals the percentage of female WSU undergraduates. Id. The ath-
letic scholarship allocations are to be calculated in the same manner (again, excluding
football). Id. at 9-10. The judge also ordered the establishment of a committee to
develop sex equity policies that will ensure equality in participation, funding, facilities,
and compensation. Id. at 11.
146. Telephone interview with Leslie Owen, Director of the Northwest Women's
Law Center (Sept. 12, 1984).
147. Id.
148. Blair, No. 28816, slip. op. at 2.
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suggests that the time has come for Washington courts to
develop a clear constitutional standard. The Washington
Supreme Court stated in Darrin that the ERA prohibits all sex-
based classifications. 149 In Marchioro, the court qualified the
absolute standard by holding that statutes intended to promote
equality are valid. 150 A return to an unqualified standard is nec-
essary to ensure equal protection of both sexes. The supreme
court may someday be asked to interpret the ERA in a case of a
sex-based classification that protects individual privacy. 151 The
absolute standard is consistent with an interpretation that
allows such sex-based classifications. A classification that sepa-
rates private areas used by men and women for their personal
needs would be characterized not as one based on sex but as one
based on the individual's right to privacy regardless of sex.
V. THE PENNSYLVANIA STANDARD OF REVIEW
In developing a strong, consistent judicial standard of
review under Washington's ERA, the Washington courts should
consider how the Pennsylvania courts have interpreted that
state's ERA. 152 The Pennsylvania courts have developed a stan-
dard that is stronger than Washington's. All the leading Penn-
sylvania ERA cases have absolutely prohibited any classification
based on sex.' 53
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held consistently that
sex may no longer be accepted as an exclusive classifying tool. 54
Such a distinction has no rational or proper foundation in law. 55
As one court noted:
The thrust of the equal rights amendment is to insure equality
of rights under the law and to eliminate sex as a basis for dis-
tinction .... The law will not impose different benefits or dif-
ferent burdens upon the members of a society based on the
149. Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at 877, 540 P.2d at 893.
150. Marchioro, 90 Wash. 2d at 306-07, 582 P.2d at 492.
151. See supra note 33.
152. PA. CONST art. I, § 28 provides: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the
individual."
153. See infra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289, 300-02, 328 A.2d 851, 856-57
(1974) (struck down as unconstitutional a portion of the criminal sentencing act that
barred the trial court from fixing minimum sentences for women).
155. Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 94, 320 A.2d 139, 141 (1974) (under ERA both
wife and husband have right to recover for loss of consortium).
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fact that they may be man or woman.156
The Pennsylvania courts have adopted and consistently applied
an absolute standard of review, unqualified by exceptions.
The Pennsylvania ERA was approved in May 1971,"'1 about
eighteen months before the Washington voters adopted their
ERA. The courts of both states have faced some of the same
issues. Both states' courts have held that girls cannot be prohib-
ited from playing interscholastic sports with boys;158 that both
parents, not just the father, are responsible for financial child
support;'59 and that wives, as well as husbands, should be
allowed to recover damages for loss of consortium."' 0 Additional
Pennsylvania cases have covered a wide range of issues affecting
a great number of people. For example, the Pennsylvania courts
have decided that the state cannot require only a husband to
pay alimony during divorce proceedings"' or deny a father a
voice in whether his child will be put up for adoption."6 2 The
state also cannot discriminate by denying workers' compensation
benefits to widowers,16 3 or by requiring pregnant teachers to
take an entire year for maternity leave.'
Several possible explanations exist for this disparity in the
willingness of the respective courts to interpret broadly their
ERA provisions. The Washington courts are inclined to avoid
the constitutional issue of discrimination when a statute
addresses the discriminatory practice. 6 5 Pennsylvania's statu-
156. Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 100, 327 A.2d 60, 61 (1974) (statutory
provision requiring husband to pay wife's alimony pendente lite, attorneys' fees, and
expenses in a divorce action violates the ERA).
157. PA. CONST. art. I, § 28.
158. Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 18 Pa. Commw.
45, 51, 334 A.2d 839, 842 (1975); Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 877, 540 P.2d 882,
893 (1975).
159. Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 541, 318 A.2d 324, 326 (1974); State v. Wood, 89
Wash. 2d 97, 103, 569 P.2d 1148, 1151 (1977).
160. Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 94, 320 A.2d 139, 141 (1974); Lundgren v.
Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 91, 96, 614 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1980).
161. Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 100, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (1974).
162. Adoption of Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 170, 360 A.2d 603, 605 (1976).
163. Oknefski v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 63 Pa. Commw. 450, 458,
439 A.2d 846, 849 (1981).
164. West Middlesex Area School Dist. v. Commonwealth, 39 Pa. Commw. 58, 65,
394 A.2d 1301, 1303-04 (1978).
165. For example, in MacLean, the court applied the Law Against Discrimination,
found the defendant's ticket-pricing practice did not discriminate, and held that the
plaintiff could not recover damages. The court refused the plaintiffs request to resolve
the dispute under the ERA. MacLean, 96 Wash. 2d at 347-48, 635 P.2d at 688. See supra
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tory framework concerning discrimination resembles Washing-
ton's, 66 but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has been more
willing to reach the constitutional issue in sex discrimination
cases. Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court maintains that
all classifications based on sex are prohibited, a decision easily
follows when the justices are presented with a valid discrimina-
tion claim. For that reason, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
may be less reluctant than the Washington Supreme Court to
resolve a case under the ERA.
Another possible explanation for the differing types of ERA
decisions in the two states is that the Pennsylvania legislature
did not immediately conform its statutory law to the new consti-
tutional standard. For instance, at the time Henderson v. Hen-
derson117 was decided, the divorce statute provided that only
husbands were required to pay alimony. Not until 1980 did the
legislature amend its divorce law to base alimony payment on
each spouse's ability to pay.'68
A practical explanation for the differences could lie in the
way Washington and Pennsylvania attorneys plead their clients'
sex discrimination claims. Attorneys in Pennsylvania may allege
violation of the ERA more frequently because they can be confi-
dent that the supreme court will review the allegation. Attorneys
in Washington do not yet have a full understanding of how the
supreme court would handle any given fact situation, so they
rely on strong statutory laws such as the Law Against
Discrimination." 9
In order to allow judicial development of the ERA standard,
the Washington Supreme Court should not hesitate to reach the
text accompanying notes 122-26 for additional discussion of MacLean.
166. Washington and Pennsylvania both have statutes prohibiting sex discrimina-
tion in employment, public accommodations, housing, real estate, and credit transac-
tions. See 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-955 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1984); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 49.60.010-.030 (1983). Both statutes prohibit discrimination in the private sec-
tor, but the application of both state ERAs has been limited to government activities.
See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 65 Pa. Commw. 236, 243, 442
A.2d 382, 385 (1982) (court found sufficient state action when the insurance commis-
sioner exceeded statutory authority by affirmatively using sex as a factor to determine
insurance rates); MacLean v. First N.W. Indus., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 347-48, 635 P.2d 683,
687-88 (1981) (court required a showing of state action to maintain an action under the
ERA).
167. 438 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974).
168. 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 501-07 (Purdon Supp. 1984). "The court may allow
alimony as it deems reasonable to either party . Id. § 501(a).
169. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 49.60 (1983).
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constitutional question in sex discrimination cases. After all, the
constitution is the supreme law of the state. The absolute stan-
dard of review could be simply and consistently applied in most
cases-any legislative classification based on sex violates the
ERA.
VI. CONCLUSION
In its ERA decisions so far, the Washington Supreme Court
has failed to apply consistently the constitutional mandate of
the ERA. The court has recognized that the voters intended the
ERA to end sex discrimination and that the ERA should be
stronger than constitutional standards existing at the time it was
adopted, 170 but the court has also succeeded in eroding that
mandate by finding irrational exceptions. The Washington
Supreme Court should follow the example set by the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court and apply an absolute standard. Absolutely
no sex-based classifications, except those based on an individual
right to privacy, are valid. Article XXXI has no force or mean-
ing in Washington unless the state supreme court interprets the
words of the ERA literally.
Patricia L. Proebsting
170. Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975). See supra text accom-
panying notes 79-87.
Presumably the people in adopting Const. art. 31 intended to do more
than repeat what was already contained in the otherwise governing (federal
and state] constitutional provisions . . . .Any other view would mean the peo-
ple intended to accomplish no change in the existing constitutional law gov-
erning sex discrimination . . . . Had such a limited purpose been intended,
there would have been no necessity to resort to the broad, sweeping mandatory
language of the Equal Rights Amendment.
Id. at 871, 540 P.2d at 889.
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